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We examine whether firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activity is due to managers 
acting at the expense of their owners or in-line with owner preferences. The former implies that 
CSR activity is more prevalent among firms with entrenched managers, whereas the latter 
suggests that CSR activity is higher in firms with more vigilant owners. Consistent with the 
shareholder-driven view, our empirical results show that CEO turnover-financial performance 
sensitivity increases in firm CSR scores, measured contemporaneously as well as prior to CEO 
appointment. Further, CSR ratings remain unchanged following CEO turnover and are associated 
with measures of superior owner oversight.   
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1.	  Introduction	  
We empirically examine the relation between firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
activity and the likelihood of their Chief Executive Officer’s dismissal due to poor financial 
performance.1 The purpose of our empirical analysis is to test two competing hypotheses that are 
the subject of academic debate: is CSR due to poor firm governance, i.e. an agency problem 
between entrenched managers and firm owners, or because of owners’ preferences for their 
firms’ socially responsible activities (Benabou and Tirole, 2010)?  Our examination of the 
relation between a firm’s CSR ratings and the likelihood that its CEO is dismissed because of 
poor financial performance is premised on the argument that agency problems are more likely if 
a CEO is immune from the threat of removal (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998).  
An agency perspective implies that owners’ inability to remove underperforming managers (poor 
firm governance) results in managers engaging in CSR activity from which they privately benefit 
at the expense of shareholders (Tirole, 2001; Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Cespa and Cestone, 
2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2010). Consequently, firm CSR ratings are negatively associated with 
the likelihood that its CEO is dismissed in light of poor financial performance. In contrast, the 
owner preference perspective implies that higher CSR ratings are associated with superior 
oversight of management because it is shareholders that motivate managers to pursue CSR 
activities either because these activities increase long-term firm value or because of their desire 
to accommodate stakeholder preferences. Owners’ greater emphasis on CSR activities in their 
manager’s performance assessment is then accompanied with a concomitant increased emphasis 
on financial performance to prevent their manager from over allocating effort towards socially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Publicly listed US firms expend significant resources on socially responsible initiatives such as providing generous 
employee benefits, supporting local communities and investing in clean technology. A survey by the Center for 
Corporate Citizenship (Boston College) found that, despite the financial crisis, in 2013 97% of companies reported 
having an operating budget dedicated to corporate citizenship, compared to 81% in 2010. Moreover, CSR reporting 
by firms has been increasing, with 93% of the world’s top firms issuing sustainability reports in 2012/2013 
according to KPMG’s 2013 Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting. Additionally, CSR is playing an 
increasingly significant role in shaping consumers’ preferences. A recent study by the Reputation Institute found 
that 89% (6%) of consumers are willing to recommend companies with excellent (poor) CSR ratings. 	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responsible activities (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). As a result, CSR ratings are positively 
associated with CEO turnover-financial performance sensitivity, when CSR activity is 
shareholder motivated.  
Using a sample of public U.S. firms from 1996 to 2005 we examine the relation between 
performance induced (forced) CEO turnover and firm CSR ratings, by regressing CEO turnover 
on multiple dimensions of CSR as well as their interaction with firm stock returns. Our measures 
of CSR activity are the firm level ratings of corporate social performance by Kinder, Lydenberg 
and Domini Research and Analytics (KLD) that have been widely used in previous studies that 
examine CSR. KLD (now MSCI ESG Research) provides research, ratings and analysis of the 
environmental, social and governance-related business practices of companies. KLD provides 
firm-level annual scores of strengths and concerns related to seven CSR dimensions: community, 
corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and product. 
Strengths measure proactive actions by firms to enhance their social performance (e.g. spousal 
benefits to same sex partners), whereas concerns reflect deficiencies related to social objectives 
(e.g. environmental failures). We measure each firm’s CSR activity as each individual category’s 
net score (strengths – concerns), aggregate strengths and concerns, as well as the aggregate net 
score across categories. 
In a sample of 1,111 publicly listed US firms, we find that the likelihood of CEO dismissal due 
to poor financial performance, as measured by firm stock returns, increases in their firm’s overall 
CSR rating in the years prior to the turnover as well as in the year prior to the previous CEO’s 
departure. Moreover, the performance related CEO dismissal likelihood is increasing in CSR 
strengths that reflect proactive socially responsible activities by firms (e.g. family benefits to 
same-sex partners), but not in CSR concerns related to poor outcomes (e.g. employment 
discrimination lawsuit). In fact, for the subsample of firms with greater CSR concerns than 
strengths, CEO turnover is unrelated to financial performance. Our results are robust to the 
inclusion of managerial, firm and industry characteristics that past research has shown to affect 
executive turnover, and are both statistically and economically significant. A ten percent 
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negative quarterly stock return increases CEO turnover likelihood by 1.1 percent for firms with 
net CSR scores of zero, and 1.94 percent for those with positive net CSR. Thus, our empirical 
results are inconsistent with the agency view of CSR and instead suggest that CSR is positively 
associated with effective firm governance.  
We further examine whether CSR is associated with characteristics often associated with 
effective firm governance such as board size, CEO tenure, percentage of independent directors, 
CEO and director stock ownership, number of board meetings, the E- (entrenchment) index and 
number of board members on the corporate governance committee. We find that firm CSR 
ratings are positively associated with greater CEO and board ownership, board meeting 
frequency and lower E-index scores. We subsequently control for these firm governance 
characteristics and find that the conditional likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor financial 
performance increases in firm CSR ratings. Finally, we examine changes in firm CSR following 
CEO departure to determine whether CSR activities are a firm or managerial characteristic. We 
find that firms’ CSR ratings do not significantly change post-CEO turnover in both univariate 
and multivariate tests that control for prior financial performance. This finding further supports 
the view that CSR is driven by owner preferences rather than by managers’ personal preferences.  
Our study makes several contributions to the existing empirical research that examines the 
economics of CSR. While the literature has largely focused on the relation between CSR and 
firm financial performance, it has yielded mixed results: some researchers find positive 
associations between CSR activity and firm value, whereas others show a negative relation or no 
significant association at all (see Deng et al., 2013 and Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2007 
for a review). Additionally, these studies are largely plagued with issues related to measurement 
horizon and reverse causality, i.e. the duration over which financial performance is measured and 
whether superior financial performance causes firms to invest in CSR activity. We avoid the 
causation issues that plague prior studies that examine the association between CSR and 
financial performance by examining the relation between CSR and the effectiveness of firm 
governance in mitigating agency problems. By examining if CSR is related to managerial 
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entrenchment we are able to answer the crucial question of whether or not CSR is driven by 
agency concerns. Our results complement recent findings that the stock market reacts positively 
to increases in firm CSR ratings (Kruger, 2014). Further, our results suggest that shareholder 
preferences have a critical role in shaping CSR policy as well as in the corporate governance of 
firms; as such we provide evidence consistent with the strategic view of CSR proposed by 
Benabou and Tirole (2010). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we develop our hypotheses 
concerning the relation between CSR and the likelihood of performance related CEO turnover. In 
Section 3, we provide details on the sample selection and provide descriptive statistics on our 
variables of interest. We discuss our empirical specification and results in Section 4. We describe 
several robustness tests of our results in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude. 
2. CSR and executive turnover 
While CSR has acquired the reputation of being a catch-all phrase for an array of different 
concepts, theoretical views on its economic determinants can be broadly categorized into two 
competing visions of CSR: agency driven and shareholder driven. According to the agency 
driven view of CSR, CEOs engage in social projects for their own personal benefit as a way to 
build their reputation or to entrench themselves in the firm (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; 
Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). Cespa and Cestone (2007) argue that incumbent CEOs under 
the threat of being replaced, strategically utilize CSR activities as an entrenchment strategy, i.e. 
by “buying off” company stakeholders. Pagano and Volpin (2005) provide a theoretical model in 
which top managers and lower level employees collude in order to entrench managers and avoid 
takeover threats. Specifically, high-level managers buy employee support by increasing 
employee benefits, which deters potential takeovers thereby lowering the likelihood of 
managerial turnover.  
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Barnea and Rubin (2010) argue that top-managers over-invest in CSR activities in order to 
enhance their own personal reputations as good global citizens since the cost is borne by 
shareholders. Letza et al. (2004) provides an analytical framework called the “abuse of executive 
power” to explain this rent seeking behavior by firm managers. They state: “(the) major problem 
with current corporate governance arrangements are that they provide excessive power to 
executive managers who may abuse this power in pursuit of their own interests” (Letza et al., 
2004, p. 245). In a similar note, Lavelle (2002) provides anecdotal evidence as to the use of 
philanthropic giving by CEOs to compromise the independence of influential directors on the 
board. Finally, Bartkus et al. (2002) argue that CSR (more specifically, corporate philanthropy) 
is associated with increases in agency problems. Collectively, these arguments are predicated on 
the view that firms’ CSR activities are due to agency problems between owners and firms’ 
managers.  
CSR activities can potentially represent owner preferences for promoting good corporate 
citizenship in society due to idiosyncratic, “warm glow”, preferences for socially desirable 
activities (Benabou and Tirole, 2010). The “warm glow” preferences for CSR are based on 
beliefs that shareholders derive utility from owning firms that are socially responsible 
(Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). For example, owners prefer CSR to avoid the disutility from 
being connected to any socially stigmatized behavior related to their firm (e.g., firms using child 
labor or acting in an environmentally hazardous manner in production). This view is consistent 
with both shareholders endowed with preferences independent of their financial claims as well as 
those that only have social considerations in relation with their ownership. The former choose 
CSR because it is consistent with their general outlook, while the latter care about offsetting the 
negative social consequences of their firm’s activities (Baron, 2007; Graff and Small, 2005). 
Alternatively, a strategic view of CSR implies that shareholders believe that their long-term 
financial claims to firm assets are enhanced by firm CSR activities. Jensen (2001) argues that 
while value maximization should be the preeminent firm goal, CSR should not be viewed as an 
impediment to this goal since it is potentially a way to maximize shareholder wealth. Allen et al. 
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(2014) propose that the governance arrangement of companies (shareholder or stakeholder 
oriented) affects their competitive behavior and outcomes in the product market and, as a 
consequence, their value. Specifically, their model predicts that, in cases where there is 
uncertainty regarding the industry’s cost structure, stakeholder oriented companies perform 
better than their shareholder oriented counterparts.2 Under a shareholder driven view, both 
“warm glow” and strategic preferences imply that CSR is associated with active shareholder 
governance as opposed to a manifestation of agency problems between owners and managers.  
Our hypotheses are premised on the notion that the likelihood of a CEO’s performance related 
dismissal is reflective of owner oversight or governance over their firm’s activities. Owners’ 
oversight is critical since the separation of ownership and control in publicly held firms creates 
an opportunity for firm managers to extract private benefits from the firm (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One mechanism by which owners exercise their oversight is 
by replacing their CEO in light of poor firm performance. A large literature examining CEO 
turnover documents a significant association between forced CEO turnover and firm stock and 
accounting performance (Warner et al., 1988; Kaplan and Minton, 2008). Recent work has 
extended this line of inquiry to show that “strong” boards are more likely to dismiss their CEO 
following poor financial performance than are “weak” boards (Defond and Hung, 2004; Jenter 
and Lewellen, 2010). The upshot of these findings is that the likelihood of CEO turnover due to 
firm performance is indicative of owners’ governance of firm operations, i.e. CEOs of better 
governed firms are more likely to be dismissed for poor financial performance than their 
counterparts at poorly governed firms. 
We use this insight to determine whether firms’ corporate socially responsible activities are 
driven by managerial actions to gain private benefits (agency driven) or because such activities 
are consistent with owner preferences (shareholder driven). Specifically, we offer two competing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Edmans (2011), Derwall et al. (2005), Flammer (2013) provide evidence regarding the mechanisms through which 
CSR can enhance shareholder wealth, while Statman and Glushkov (2009), Kempf and Osthoff (2007), and Eccles 
et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence on the relation between CSR and financial performance.	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hypotheses. The agency-driven CSR predicts that firms with higher CSR scores are weakly 
governed and their CEOs are less likely to be removed in light of poor firm financial 
performance. Consequently, CEO turnover-financial performance relation is negatively 
associated with CSR because entrenched managers engage in such activities to extract private 
control benefits and “weak” firm governance reduces their likelihood of dismissal (Pagano and 
Volpin, 2005; Cestone and Cespa, 2007). Conversely, the shareholder-driven CSR hypothesis 
predicts that the CEO turnover-financial performance relation increases in firm CSR scores. 
Owners that value their firm’s CSR scores emphasize these activities in assessing CEO 
performance, but also increase their emphasis and oversight on financial performance to prevent 
over allocation of CEO attention to socially responsible tasks. The increased emphasis on 
financial performance is an implication of the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) multi-tasking 
principal agent model. If two activities are substitutes in the production function (e.g. enhancing 
financial performance and CSR) and the agent has limited attention, emphasizing only one 
activity (CSR) results in under allocation of effort towards the other (financial performance).  
Consequently, a principal desiring to motivate an agent to engage in CSR activity must also 
increase the emphasis on financial performance.3 This implies that owners of firms with higher 
CSR scores are more likely to remove their CEOs in light of poor financial performance.  
3. Data and research design 
In this section, we discuss the variables, sample and data characteristics. We also present 
descriptive statistics and our univariate analysis of the relation between CSR and CEO 
performance related turnover.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A necessary condition for this prediction is that CSR activity measures are informative and reliable.  Research by 
Godfrey et al. (2009) and Kruger (2014) attests to the informativeness and economic significance of the KLD 
measures of CSR that we employ in our empirical tests.  
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3.1 Sample selection and data sources 
We construct our sample with data from several sources. We obtain firm-level CSR scores from 
KLD for the years 1996 to 2005. KLD is an information intermediary that provides ratings for 
firms’ corporate social performance to investors, screening close to 3,000 firms.4 KLD provides 
narrative coverage of firm performance along community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, corporate governance, and product dimensions. KLD data has been 
widely used in previous studies (see, among others, Harrison and Freeman, 1999; Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Godfrey et al., 2009; Kruger, 2014) and 
represents one of the most reliable sources of information on firms’ social performance.5 We 
utilize the KLD coverage sample as our base given the need for CSR scores in our empirical 
tests. 
Using the data provided by KLD, we construct our measures of CSR for each firm. Firms are 
rated on their strengths (such as: generous employee benefits or board diversity) and concerns 
(such as: employee disputes or substantial emissions) within each of the categories. To construct 
our first measure of CSR we subtract each firm’s total concerns from their total strengths, 
aggregated across categories, obtaining a net overall performance score for each firm year. In 
addition to the net scores, we utilize separately the sum of total strengths and total concerns 
across the various categories to identify potential nonlinearities between the effects of total 
strengths versus those of total concerns. 
We merge our KLD database with Execucomp, which provides information on CEO start and 
termination dates allowing us to identify CEO turnovers by quarter. Following Dikolli et. al. 
(2009), we classify CEO turnovers as forced and unforced based on press releases around 
announcements. We conduct our tests using only forced CEO turnovers because not all CEO 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The KLD database covers companies listed on the S&P 500 from 1992 as well as the full Russell 1000 from 2002 
onward. 
5 For a detailed discussion of KLD’s framework see Sharfman (1996). 
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changes are performance related: some may leave voluntarily because of retirement, or due to 
personal circumstances, such as health reasons or death. We conduct our analysis on a sample of 
599 forced turnovers spanning the years 1996 to 2005.6 Monthly stock returns and fiscal quarter 
end stock price data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
quarterly accounting data is gathered from Compustat. Our measures for the number of board 
meetings, CEO and director ownership, board size, number of independent directors, and number 
of board members in the corporate governance committee are obtained from the Institutional 
Investors Research Center database, via Institutional Shareholders Service. 
Unlike previous studies, we follow Dikolli et al. (2009) and use both quarterly and annual data in 
our empirical tests. This design allows us to obtain more precise measures of firm performance 
with which to match CEO turnovers than those available annually. Both Compustat and CRSP 
data are available at the end of each firm’s fiscal quarter. KLD, Execucomp and IRRC data, 
which are only available on an annual basis, are matched to fiscal quarters by taking the fiscal 
year end values for each variable and applying those to each of the fiscal quarters in that year. 
Lack of CSR and firm governance variables on a quarterly basis potentially introduces error in 
our measures but we do not believe that the error is systematically correlated with the likelihood 
of CEO turnover. We measure firm performance as the industry-adjusted quarterly stock return 
(Returns) for a firm, which has been commonly used in prior literature (Brickley, 2003; Dikolli 
et al., 2009). Our final sample consists of 21,435 firm-quarter observations from 1996 to 2005, 
corresponding to 1,111 firms. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for sample firms. Our dependent variable, CEO turnover, is 
an indicator variable equal to one in the quarter in which there is a forced CEO change and zero 
otherwise. The unconditional quarterly forced CEO turnover rate in our sample is 2.8%. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Our sample begins in 1996 because the governance data that we utilize in our test is only available beginning in 
1996.	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average cumulative median industry adjusted stock return over the prior four quarters for sample 
firms is 3.5% with a median return of 2.1%.  
Prior studies have shown that performance measure variability is inversely related to the 
likelihood of performance related turnovers (Engel et al., 2003). As a result, we include return 
volatility measured as the cumulative density function of the standard deviation of the firm’s 
monthly change in stock price over the prior 60 months in our tests. The average for this measure 
in our sample is -0.321. To control for firm growth opportunities that affect the CEO turnover 
likelihood we also include each firm’s book to market ratio. The average book to market ratio in 
our sample is 0.623. Firms in our sample have average log sales of 7.938 and average log assets 
of 8.790. We further control for managerial characteristics that are associated with turnover 
likelihood by using CEO age, a variable indicating whether the CEO is close to retirement age as 
well as CEO tenure. Table 1 shows that the average CEO in the sample is 57 years old and the 
average (median) CEO tenure are 7.32 (4.89) years. Only 6.7% of sample CEOs are at retirement 
age. We partition our sample based on median tenure to conduct some of our robustness tests 
given prior findings that tenure moderates the CEO turnover-financial performance relation 
(Dikolli et al., 2009). Our firm governance variables reflect board composition and ownership of 
the firm by executives and directors. The mean firm in the sample has 10 directors on its board, 
with 68% of them independent and holding on average 8.3% of their firm’s outstanding shares. 
The boards meet on average 7 times a year and the median firm’s corporate governance 
committee has 3 members. 
In Table 2 we provide univariate correlations between CEO turnover, returns, board size, CEO 
tenure and our CSR variables. Tabulated results show that turnover is positively correlated with 
board size, CEO tenure, CSR net, CSR strengths and CSR concerns, while being significantly 
negatively correlated with returns. Overall, these results suggest that CEO turnover and CSR are 
positively related unconditionally. The following empirical tests examine this relation 
conditional on firm performance. 
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4. Empirical design and results 
We follow Dikolli et al. (2009) and run the following baseline logistic regression specification to 
estimate the determinants of CEO turnover, augmented with our firm-level CSR measures: Pr Turnover!" = α! + β!Pos  Return!" + β!Neg  Return!" + β!Ret  Vol!" + β!Board  Size!" +                                                                    β!Ind  Dir  Perc!" + β!Age!" + β!Retire  Age!" + β!Assets!" + β!BTM!" +                                                                    β!"CSR!" + β!!CSR ∗ Neg  Return!" + ϵ!"                                                       (1)      
Since forced turnovers are more likely driven by poor performance, we enhance the power of our 
tests by allowing for asymmetric effects and include separately both positive and negative stock 
returns. CSR and the interactive effect between CSR and poor firm performance, CSR*Neg 
Return, are our variables of interest. In our tests, we vary the definition of CSR depending on the 
dimension measured.  
Table 3 - Panel A reports the results from estimating our empirical specification. The baseline 
model in Model 1 is consistent with prior studies on CEO turnover (Dikolli et al., 2009), as the 
coefficient on negative returns is negative and significant and the coefficient on positive returns 
is negative and insignificant, confirming the asymmetry between positive and negative returns on 
forced CEO turnover. Also consistent with prior work, the coefficients on returns volatility, 
board size, and CEO age are all positive and significant. The coefficient on the book to market 
ratio is negative and significant, consistent with lower turnover likelihood for CEOs of larger and 
more mature firms. CSR, which we measure as the net CSR score of the firm, is unrelated to 
CEO turnover unconditionally, but the coefficient on the interaction of CSR with negative 
returns is negative and significant. Thus, CEOs of firms with higher CSR scores are more likely 
to be replaced following poor firm financial performance than their counterparts at firms with 
lower CSR scores.  
In Model 2 of Table 3 – Panel A, we measure CSR as the firm’s CSR score under the previous 
CEO and we also include the change in firm CSR score between the current and the previous 
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CEO’s appointment.7 As the CSR of the previous CEO is out of the current CEO’s control, it 
allows us to rule out the agency-driven CSR as alternative explanation of our main result. Model 
2 shows that the interaction variable, when measured as the firm’s CSR score during the previous 
CEO’s appointment, remains significant and negative. This result reinforces the prior finding that 
the positive relationship between CEO turnover and CSR is due to better firm governance rather 
than agency problems.  
In Model 3 of Table 3 – Panel A we substitute the CSR Net score with an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm’s net CSR rating is greater than zero and interact it with negative returns. In 
doing so, we examine the effect of high levels of CSR on the turnover performance relation. 
Consistent with our previous results, we find that in high CSR firms the CEO turnover-financial 
performance sensitivity significantly increases, indicating better governance.  
Given our original logistic specification that includes interactive terms we are unable to interpret 
the economic magnitude of the interaction coefficient. Consequently, in Table 3 - Panel B we run 
our base line model over three subsamples: firms with CSR net score less than zero (Model 1); 
firms with CSR net score equal to zero (Model 2); firms with CSR net score greater than zero 
(Model 3), to examine the changes in the marginal effect of negative returns on CEO turnover 
across the samples. Results suggest an increase in the marginal effects of negative performance 
on the turnover sensitivity across the samples. Negative returns do not have any significant 
impact on CEO Turnover in companies with CSR Net less than zero, while they have a 
significant impact in the sample where CSR Net is equal to zero (marginal coefficient: -0.110) 
and even more so in the sample where CSR Net is greater than zero (marginal coefficient: -
0.194). The turnover probability given negative performance increases from 1.10 percent, in the 
zero CSR sample, to 1.94 percent, in the high CSR sample, representing more than a 75 percent 
increase in the magnitude of the effect. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 We lose 91 (of 599) CEO turnover observations for which the firm CSR rating in the last year of the previous CEO 
is not available. 
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We examine whether CSR asymmetrically effects the CEO turnover-financial performance 
relation by separating the net score into CSR strengths and CSR concerns. Strengths correspond 
largely to proactive actions by firms, whereas concerns reflect deficiencies. In Table 4 - Model 1 
we show that CSR strengths drive our results, as the interaction between CSR strengths and 
negative returns is significant and negative. Conversely, in Model 2, which includes the 
interaction between CSR concerns and negative returns, we find that CSR concerns do not 
significantly impact the CEO turnover-financial performance relation. In Model 3, which 
includes both strengths and concerns, we see that the interaction between CSR strengths and 
negative returns remains significant while CSR concerns do not play a significant incremental 
role in explaining performance-related CEO turnovers. Finally, in Model 4 and 5 we replace 
CSR strengths and concerns with those of the previous CEO, in order to rule out the possibility 
of the agency-driven CSR explaining our main result. In Model 4, we find that the interaction 
variable between CSR strength and negative returns is still significant, consistent with the 
interpretation of CSR scores representing good governance. In Model 5, CSR Concerns is 
significant and negative but when interacted with negative returns it is insignificant.  
Collectively, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that higher levels of CSR increase the likelihood that a CEO 
is dismissed for poor firm performance. This positive association is more indicative of CSR 
being driven by shareholder preferences, i.e. good governance, rather than by agency problems 
that imply a negative association between the CEO turnover-performance relation and CSR. 
5. Robustness and sensitivity analysis 
While our results in the previous section are consistent with the shareholder-driver view of CSR, 
rather than the agency view, in this section we examine their robustness to the inclusion of 
additional firm characteristics. Specifically, we examine whether firms’ observable corporate 
governance attributes are associated with CSR ratings, whether CSR ratings incrementally 
explain the CEO turnover-performance relation, and how CEO turnover affects firm CSR 
ratings. 
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5.1 Corporate governance attributes between high and low CSR firms 
In Table 5 we examine differences in the governance characteristics of firms with CSR scores 
less than zero, equal to zero, and greater than zero. In particular, we examine whether high CSR 
(net CSR greater than zero) and low CSR (net CSR less than zero) differ in the following 
governance attributes: board size, CEO tenure, percentage of independent directors, CEO age, 
the percentage of voting power held by the board excluding the CEO, number of board meetings, 
size of the corporate governance committee, book to market ratio, sales (log), assets (log), shares 
held by CEO (%) and the Entrenchment Index (E-Index) introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009). If 
CSR were driven by an agency problem we would expect that high CSR firms display “weaker” 
corporate governance than their low CSR counterparts. Our univariate results in Table 5 show 
that high CSR firms have significantly larger boards, greater director voting rights, larger 
corporate governance committee, and higher CEO ownership. High CSR firms are also larger 
and have lower book to market ratios. Finally, high and low CSR firms do not differ significantly 
in CEO tenure, board independence, number of board meetings and E-Index. Overall, high CSR 
firms seem to exhibit “stronger” corporate governance attributes rather than “weaker” 
governance characteristics as would be predicted by the agency driven view of CSR. 
5.2 CSR and CEO turnover controlling for governance characteristics 
While our main tests show that CSR increases the CEO turnover-financial performance relation, 
this is potentially driven by firms’ governance choices that are correlated with both CSR and 
increases in CEO turnover-financial performance sensitivity. Since CSR scores are, in fact, 
associated with firm governance choices, we examine whether the variation in CSR that is 
unexplained by firm governance choices affects the relation between firm performance and CEO 
turnover.8  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In concurrent work, Cheng et al. (2013) test the agency driven view of CSR using the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut. 
They find that firms with intermediate managerial ownership decreased CSR after the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut 
reflecting an increase in relative CEO ownership and a reduction in agency problems. We address this issue by using 
CEO ownership as a determinant of CSR. 
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In order to isolate the CSR component related to firm governance characteristics, we run a 
determinants model of CSR net, CSR strengths and CSR concerns using an OLS regression 
controlling for firm size, CEO and director shareholding, board size, industry, and year fixed 
effects. We use the predicted CSR from the model as our measure of CSR determined by firm 
governance choices and the residual as the unexplained CSR. Table 6 - Panel A reports the 
results of using the predicted and residual CSR and their interactions with negative returns as 
determinants of CEO turnover. Results of the specification in Model 1 shows that only the 
coefficient on the interaction between the residual CSR and negative returns is significant in 
explaining performance related CEO turnover while the coefficient on predicted CSR and its 
interaction is not significant. Model 2, which uses the predicted and residual components of CSR 
strengths, also confirms that the residual and its interaction significantly predict financial 
performance related CEO turnover while the predicted value does not. Finally in Model 3, where 
the CSR concerns score is used, both the predicted and residual CSR and their interactive effects 
are insignificant in predicting performance related CEO turnover. Overall, these results are 
consistent with CSR having a positive effect on CEO turnover-financial performance sensitivity 
independent of firm governance characteristics and as such further supports the view that CSR 
scores reflect shareholder preferences rather than agency problems between managers and 
owners. 
Dikolli et al. (2009) find that the negative relation between CEO turnover and firm performance 
monotonically declines in CEO tenure, consistent with firm performance revealing information 
about a CEO’s uncertain ability to increase firm value over time. We use this insight to enhance 
the power of our empirical tests. Specifically in Table 6 – Panel B we rerun our baseline model 
over samples of low (Model 1) and high (Model 2) tenured CEOs. We find that the interactive 
effect of CSR and negative returns is significant and negative in the low tenure sample and 
insignificant in the high tenure sample. This is consistent with the impact of CSR being stronger 
on lower tenured CEOs whose ability is more uncertain and as such their performance carries a 
significant weight on the turnover decision while for high tenured CEOs whose ability is more 
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certain due to their experience, CSR does not incrementally affect the turnover performance 
sensitivity. 
5.3 CEO turnover and changes in CSR 
To shed further light on whether firms’ CSR activities are a managerial or firm characteristic we 
investigate the changes in firms’ CSR ratings around turnover years and compare them with 
changes in non-turnover years. In order to reduce measurement error in our change measures we 
take the two-year average before and after each turnover for comparison. In conducting this 
analysis, we are able to examine whether a CEO affects the CSR score using the turnover as the 
event, consequently changes in CSR reflect an incoming CEO’s influence on CSR. The agency 
view predicts that the change is significantly negative in turnover years as compared to non-
turnover years since the outgoing CEO was likely dismissed for over investing in socially 
responsible activities. In Table 7 - Panel A we address this by comparing the changes in firm 
CSR scores between CEO turnover years and non-turnover years along the various categories. 
Results show that there is no significant difference between changes in Net CSR around 
turnovers as compared to non-turnover years.  
While univariate results support the shareholder driven view of CSR, the effect of CEO turnover 
is potentially confounded with the effect of past negative performance that led to executive 
departure. In Table 7 - Panel B we run a logistic regression of an indicator variable set to one 
when the change in CSR is greater than zero and zero when the change in CSR is less than zero 
as the dependent variable. We do this for CSR net, CSR strengths and CSR concerns. We regress 
these indicator variables on a negative return indicator variable, set to one when returns are 
negative, a CEO turnover indicator variable, the interaction between CEO turnover and the 
negative returns indicator variable, and the change in log firm assets. We additionally control for 
year and industry fixed effects. Results indicate that CEO turnover does not affect changes in 
CSR. Additionally, the interaction between CEO turnover and negative firm returns is 
insignificant. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the notion that CSR is a managerial 
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choice rather than a firm characteristic. By examining CSR around CEO turnovers we are able to 
disentangle managerial effects from firm effects, thus overcoming limitations of previous studies 
that rely on cross-sectional tests. We conclude that CSR activities are unlikely to be driven by 
managers and largely reflect firm owners’ choices.  
6. Conclusion 
Despite the prevalence and economic significance of Corporate Social Responsibility activities, 
firms’ motives for engaging in such activities remain the subject of great academic debate 
(Margolis et al., 2007; Benabou and Tirole, 2010). Amongst this debate two broad views of CSR 
have emerged: the agency driven view and shareholder driven view. Proponents of the agency 
perspective view CSR as being driven by CEOs who engage in social projects for their own 
private benefit as a way to build their reputation or to entrench themselves in the firm, thereby 
adversely affecting shareholder value (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 
2012). In contrast, the shareholder perspective implies that it is owners that motivate their firm’s 
manager to pursue CSR activities either to increase the value of their financial claims or to 
accommodate their non-monetary preferences. 
In this paper, we examine the relation between CSR and firms’ governance quality. Specifically, 
we examine the effect of a firm’s CSR rating on the likelihood that its CEO is dismissed due to 
poor financial performance. A large literature, premised on the notion that agency problems are 
more likely if a CEO is entrenched, has shown that the likelihood of CEO performance-related 
dismissal is indicative of firm-level governance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). We use this 
insight to determine whether CSR activity is a result of poor governance, i.e. an agency problem 
between owners and managers, or rather reflects owners’ preferences. We find that the likelihood 
of CEO dismissal due to poor financial performance, as measured by firm stock returns, is 
increasing in the firm’s overall CSR rating, measured both in the departing CEO’s last year as 
well as in the last year of the previous CEO’s appointment. Moreover, the performance related 
dismissal likelihood is increasing in CSR strengths that reflect proactive socially responsible 
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activities by firms (e.g. family benefits to same-sex partners), but not in CSR concerns that 
largely reflect poor outcomes (e.g. employment discrimination lawsuit). 
Our results remain robust to the inclusion of firm governance characteristics such as board size, 
CEO tenure, percentage of independent directors, CEO age, CEO and director ownership, 
number of board meetings, and number of board members on the corporate governance 
committee. We document that high CSR firms are associated with better firm governance; 
however, even after controlling for these characteristics, firm CSR ratings are positively related 
to CEO turnover-financial performance sensitivity. Finally, we examine the influence of the 
CEO on the CSR activities of the firm by examining differences in firm CSR ratings around 
turnovers. We find that firm CSR scores do not change around turnovers when compared to non-
turnover years. This finding corroborates the view that CSR is driven by shareholder preferences 
rather than by managers’ personal preferences. 
We contribute to the literature by relating CSR to the effectiveness of the firm’s corporate 
governance, thereby abstracting from the shortcomings of previous studies that examine the 
association between CSR and financial performance. By examining if CSR is reflective of good 
governance we are able to answer the question of whether CSR is driven by an agency problem. 
This has the advantage of addressing an important question without the empirical problems 
related to reverse causality and measurement horizon inherent in CSR-financial performance 
association studies. 
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CEO Turnover 21,435 0.028 0.001 0 0 0
Returns 21,424 0.035 0.287 -0.121 0.021 0.176
Returms volatility 20,316 -0.321 0.889 -1.082 -0.420 0.350
Missed Earnings 21,435 0.66 1.369 0 0 1
Board Size 21,435 10.324 2.758 8 10 12
Independent Directors (%) 21,435 0.681 0.158 0.571 0.7 0.8
CEO Age 21,337 57.08 6.95 52 57 61
CEO Tenure 21,435 7.322 7.475 2.164 4.898 9.753
Retirement Age CEO 21,361 0.067 0.251 0 0 0
Book to Market Ratio 21,412 0.623 0.254 0.423 0.631 0.836
Sales (log) 21,426 7.938 1.366 6.974 7.872 8.868
Assets (log) 21,427 8.790 1.593 7.095 8.671 0.924
Voting power held by board excl. CEO (%) 19,346 8.317 18.456 0.007 1.708 7.362
Shares held by CEO (%) 21,435 2.766 6.415 0 0.31 1.91
Number of Board Meetings 6,842 7.167 2.885 5 7 8
Number of Board Memb on C.Gov Comm 18,611 2.798 2.276 0 3 4
CSR Strengths 21,435 1.972 2.211 0 1 3
CSR Concerns 21,435 1.943 2.096 1 1 3
CSR Net 21,435 0.798 3.147 -1 0 2
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. We report the mean, standard deviation and 
values of the interquartile range for the following variables: CEO Turnover is an indicator variable equal to one in the 
quarter in which a forced CEO change occurs and zero otherwise. Returns are the cumulative median-industry-adjusted (2-
digit SIC) mothly stock returns computed from CRSP for the four quarters immediately preceding the turnover quarter, or if 
the CEO was employed for less than four quarters, the cumulative returns over the CEO’s tenure. Industry values are 
calculated from all available monthly observations of sample firms. Returns volatility is the cumulative density function of 
the standard deviation of firm's monthly change in stock price over the prior 60 months. Missed Earnings is the sum of the 
number of the negative quarterly surprises, measured as the number of negative quarterly analyst forecast errors, or 
quarterly earnings decreases relative to the same quarter of the prior year over the four quarters immediately preceding the 
quarter. For CEOs employed for less than four quarters, we count the number of surprises over the CEO’s tenure. Board Size 
is the number of directors on the firm’s board of directors. Independent Directors (%) is the percentage of independent 
directors on the firm’s board. CEO Age is the age of the CEO, in years, as of the quarter immediately prior to the quarter. 
CEO Tenure is the number of years as CEO of the firm. Retirement Age CEO is an indicator variable equal to one if CEO 
age equals 64, 65 or 66 years, zero otherwise. Book to Market Ratio  is the firm’s book value of equity divided by its market 
value of equity at fiscal quarter end. Sales (log) is the logarithm of sales.  Assets (log)  is the logarithm of assets. Voting 
power held by board excluding CEO (%)  is the percentage of voting power held by the board not including the CEO shares. 
Shares held by CEO (%) is the percentage of voting power held by CEO. Number of Board Meetings  is the number of 
meetings held by the board during the year. Number of Board Members on C.Gov Committee is the number of members in 
the corporate governance committee of the board. CSR Strengths is the sum of the total strengths for a firm across all 
categories of CSR, as reported by KLD. CSR Concerns is the sum of the total concerns for a firm across various categories 
of CSR. CSR Net is the difference between a firm's total strengths and total concerns.  All variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% level.
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation
1st 
Quartile Median
3rd 
Quartile
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Variable
CEO Turnover 1
Returns -0.047 *** 1
Board Size 0.029 *** -0.053 *** 1
CEO Tenure 0.088 *** 0.024 *** -0.039 *** 1
CSR Net 0.012 * 0.007 0.172 *** -0.045 *** 1
CSR Strengths 0.025 *** -0.033 *** 0.303 *** -0.101 *** 0.728 *** 1
CSR Concerns 0.033 *** -0.056 *** 0.215 *** -0.101 *** -0.271 *** 0.351 *** 1
Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
This table displays the Pearson pairwise correlations among our main variables of interest for our sample, which is 
composed of 20,227 firm-quarter observations. We show the correlation between CEO Turnover, Returns, Board Size, 
CEO Tenure, CSR Net, CSR Strengths and CSR Concerns. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.                                                                                                                                                     
Levels of significance are indicated by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(9)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8)
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CSR Net 0.007 0.009 0.031
(0.013) (0.018) (0.104)
[0.0007] [0.000] [0.003]
Interaction CSR Net - Negative Returns -0.152 *** -0.112 * -1.195 **
(0.051) (0.065) (0.433)
[-0.014] [-0.009] [-0.115]
CSR (Change) -0.024
(0.034)
[-0.002]
Interaction CSR (Change)- Negative Returns -0.130
(0.139)
[-0.011]
Positive Returns -0.003 -0.223 -0.066
(0.199) (0.216) (0.238)
Negative Returns -1.151 *** -0.918 *** -0.668 **
(0.224) (0.257) (0.333)
[-0.108] [-0.077] [-0.064]
Returns Volatility 0.197 *** 0.200 *** 0.171 ***
(0.053) (0.066) (0.061)
Board Size 0.043 ** 0.049 ** 0.028
(0.017) (0.021) (0.020)
Independent Directors (%) 0.479 0.450 0.331
(0.259) (0.313) (0.293)
CEO Age (log) 5.768 *** 6.527 *** 5.471 ***
(0.417) (0.477) (0.472)
Retirement Age CEO 0.177 0.238 * 0.285 **
(0.129) (0.138) (0.146)
Assets (log) 0.041 0.137 *** 0.059 *
(0.030) (0.038) (0.034)
Book to Market Ratio -0.367 ** -0.018 -0.450 **
(0.166) (0.205) (0.191)
Intercept -26.442 *** -32.964 *** -25.026 ***
(1.788) (2.346) (2.058)
Number of observations 20,227 19,268 14,780
Year and Industry Fixed Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 323.45 *** 439.60 *** 316.73 ***
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.113 0.075
High/Low 
CSR
(2)
Table 3 - Panel A
Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on CEO Turnover Performance Sensitivity
This table analyzes the determinants of CEO Turnover, which is the dependent variable. Our main 
variable of interest is the interaction between CSR and Negative Returns. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard Errors are clustered by firm and are reported in 
parenthesis. Margins are reported in square brackets. Model (1) is run over the full sample; Model 
(2) measures CSR as the CSR score of the previous CEO, which is out of the control of the current 
CEO; Model (3) measures CSR as an indicator variable which is set to 1 if CSR net >0, to 0 if CSR 
net<0, and missing if CSR net=0.                                                                                                                                                                                      
Levels of significance are indicated by:  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(3)
Variable
(1)
Previous 
CEO's CSR
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Positive Returns -0,644 0.187 0.342
(0.414) (0.361) (0.291)
[-0.060] [0.016] [0.033]
Negative Returns -0.457 -1.273 *** -1.966 ***
(0.382) (0.423) (0.320)
[-0.042] [-0.110] [-0.194]
Number of observations 6,626 5,447 8,154
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Year and Industry Fixed Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 82.88 *** 83.57 *** 171.06 ***
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.089 0.081
Table 3 - Panel B
Marginal effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on CEO Turnover Performance Sensitivity
This table analyzes the marginal effects of CSR Net on CEO Turnover. The dependent variable is CEO 
Turnover; our main variable of interest is Negative Returns. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level. Standard Errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parenthesis. Margins are reported in 
square brackets. Model (1) is run over a subsample of observations in which the value of CSR Net is 
below 0, Model (2) is run over a subsample of observations in which CSR Net is 0 and, finally, Model (3) 
is run over a subsample of observations in which CSR Net is above 0.                                                                            
Levels of significance are indicated by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Variable
(1) (2) (3)
CSR Net < 0 CSR Net = 0 CSR Net >0
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CSR Strengths 0.002 -0.000 -0.012
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020)
[.0002] [-0.000] [-0.001]
Interaction CSR Strengths - Neg. Returns -0.157 *** -0.165 *** -0.112 *
(0.046) (0.050) (0.060)
[-0.014] [-0.015] [-0.009]
CSR Concerns 0.0157 0.022 -0.079 **
(0.022) (0.022) (0.035)
[0.001] [0.002] [-0.006]
Interaction CSR Concerns - Neg. Returns -0.047 0.044 -0.044
(0.090) (0.097) (0.135)
[-0.004] [0.004] [-0.003]
CSR (Change) 0.097 ** 0.244 ***
(0.040) (0.054)
[0.008] [0.020]
Interaction CSR (Change)- Negative Returns -0.163 -0.146
(0.144) (0.215)
[-0.013] [-0.012]
Positive Returns -0.005 -0.0003 0.00008 -0.216 -0.158
(0.200) (0.199) (0.199) (0.216) (0.215)
Negative Returns -0.790 *** -1.206 *** -0.853 *** -0.645 ** -0.826 **
(0.263) (0.294) (0.305) (0.305) (0.358)
[-0.0743] [-0.113] [-0.080] [-0.054] [-0.069]
Returns Volatility 0.193 *** 0.196 *** 0.189 *** 0.206 *** 0.216 ***
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.066) (0.066)
Board Size 0.044 ** 0.046 *** 0.045 ** 0.050 ** 0.050 **
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
Independent Directors (%) 0.455 * 0.438 * 0.430 0.501 0.433
(0.260) (0.259) (0.261) (0.314) (0.314)
CEO Age (log) 5.778 *** 5.736 *** 5.772 *** 6.540 *** 6.431 ***
(0.417) (0.415) (0.417) (0.478) (0.474)
Retirement Age CEO 0.186 0.175 0.187 0.216 0.225
(0.129) (0.130) (0.129) (0.138) (0.138)
Assets (log) 0.0224 0.029 0.009 0.124 *** 0.176 ***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.044) (0.048)
Book to Market Ratio -0.321 * -0.385 ** -0.314 * -0.050 0.032
(0.171) (0.164) (0.170) (0.204) (0.204)
Intercept -26.342 *** -26.226 *** -26.255 *** -33.270 *** -32.517 ***
(1.789) (1.785) (1.793) (2.364) (2.333)
Number of observations 20,227 20,227 20,227 19,268 19,268
Year and Industry Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 330.39 *** 317.32 *** 332.35 *** 455.39 *** 494.67 ***
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.075 0.076 0.116 0.120
Table 4
(5)
Effect of CSR (Strength and Concerns) on CEO Turnover Performance Sensitivity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
This table analyzes the determinants of CEO Turnover. The dependent variable is CEO Turnover; our main variables of interest are 
CSR Strengths, CSR Concerns and their interaction with Negative Returns. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
Standard Errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parenthesis. Margins are reported in square brackets. Model (1) has CSR 
Strengths, Model (2) has CSR Concerns and Model (3) has both Strengths and Concerns. In Models (4) and (5) we replace CSR 
Strengths and Concerns with those of the previous CEO, independent of the current CEO's action, as well as examine the change in 
CSR from that of the previous CEO. We look at the interaction between the previous CEO's CSR Strength and Concerns and 
Negative Returns as well as the interaction between changes in Strengths and Concerns and Negative Returns.                                                                                                                                 
Levels of significance are indicated by:  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
	   28 
 
B
oa
rd
 S
iz
e
9.
36
3
9.
02
3
10
.4
57
1.
09
4
(9
)
(9
)
(1
0.
25
)
(1
.2
5)
C
EO
 T
en
ur
e
7.
44
0
7.
35
0
7.
33
0
-0
.1
09
(5
.3
99
)
(5
.3
19
)
(4
.9
13
)
(-
0.
48
6)
In
de
pe
nd
en
t D
ire
ct
or
s 
(%
)
0.
67
9
0.
69
7
0.
67
7
-0
.0
01
(0
.6
92
)
(0
.7
14
)
(0
.7
00
)
(0
.0
08
)
C
EO
 A
ge
56
.6
0
55
.8
20
56
.5
74
-0
.0
27
(5
7)
(5
6)
(5
7.
11
1)
(0
.1
11
)
Vo
tin
g 
po
w
er
 h
el
d 
by
 b
oa
rd
 e
xc
l. 
C
EO
 (%
)
7.
97
1
8.
50
9
9.
42
3
1.
45
1
(2
.7
30
)
(2
.5
38
)
(1
.6
66
)
(-
1.
06
4)
N
um
be
r o
f B
oa
rd
 M
ee
tin
gs
7.
15
2
7.
27
9
7.
24
1
0.
08
8
(6
.6
66
)
(7
)
(6
.5
)
(-
0.
16
6)
N
um
 o
f B
oa
rd
 M
em
b 
on
 C
.G
ov
 C
om
m
2.
65
6
3.
16
1
2.
85
9
0.
20
2
(2
.6
66
)
(3
)
(2
.8
75
)
(0
.2
09
)
B
oo
k 
to
 M
ar
ke
t
0.
65
4
0.
72
4
0.
62
0
-0
.0
33
(0
.6
60
)
(0
.7
35
)
(0
.6
25
)
(-
0.
03
5)
Sa
le
s 
(lo
g)
7.
42
8
6.
91
1
7.
74
7
0.
31
8
(7
.3
84
)
(6
.8
42
)
(7
.7
05
)
(0
.3
21
)
A
ss
et
s 
(lo
g)
7.
68
1
7.
11
1
8.
06
0
0.
37
8
(7
.5
65
)
(6
.9
30
)
(7
.8
85
)
(0
.3
20
)
Sh
ar
es
 h
el
d 
by
 C
EO
 (%
)
3.
31
1
2.
58
1
4.
36
8
1.
05
6
(0
.8
97
)
(1
.1
1)
(1
.1
3)
(0
.2
33
)
E-
In
de
x
2.
54
9
2.
71
0
2.
44
2
-0
.1
07
(3
)
(3
)
(2
.3
33
)
(-
0.
67
0)
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
50
7
17
2
43
2
1.
83
9
**
2.
00
0
**
-1
.2
21
-1
.2
17
3.
46
4
**
*
3.
51
3
**
*
3.
59
9
**
*
3.
12
0
**
*
1.
79
0
**
1.
19
8
-2
.1
70
**
-1
.8
29
*
1.
21
0
-2
.3
09
**
0.
44
9
-0
.7
12
-0
.2
04
0.
22
7
-0
.0
66
0.
24
9
6.
55
5
**
*
5.
88
3
**
*
-0
.2
44
-0
.3
58
Ta
bl
e 
5
C
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
in
 H
ig
h 
&
 L
ow
 C
SR
 F
ir
m
s
Th
is
 ta
bl
e 
co
m
pa
re
s 
th
e 
m
ea
ns
 a
nd
 m
ed
ia
ns
 (i
n 
pa
re
nt
he
si
s)
 o
f f
irm
s 
w
ith
 C
SR
 N
et
 <
 0
 a
nd
 C
SR
 N
et
 >
 0
, t
o 
ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 c
or
po
ra
te
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
an
d 
ot
he
r f
irm
 a
ttr
ib
ut
es
. W
e 
pe
rf
or
m
  t
-te
st
 a
nd
 W
ilc
ox
on
 ra
nk
 s
um
 te
st
, t
he
 n
ul
l h
yp
ot
he
si
s 
be
in
g 
th
at
 th
e 
m
ea
n 
an
d 
m
ed
ia
n 
of
 C
SR
 N
et
 <
 0
 a
nd
 C
SR
 N
et
 >
 0
 fi
rm
s 
ar
e 
eq
ua
l. 
Th
e 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
st
at
is
tic
s 
ar
e 
pe
rf
or
m
ed
 o
n 
a 
to
ta
l o
f 1
,1
11
 fi
rm
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
, e
ac
h 
co
m
pa
ny
 h
av
in
g 
on
e 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n 
pe
r v
ar
ia
bl
e.
 T
he
 o
bs
er
va
tio
n 
is
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
va
ria
bl
e 
fo
r t
he
 y
ea
rs
 a
va
ila
bl
e.
 T
he
 te
st
s 
ar
e 
pe
rf
or
m
ed
 
on
 a
 to
ta
l o
f 9
39
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 w
ith
  C
SR
 N
et
 d
iff
er
en
t f
ro
m
 z
er
o.
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
t a
nd
 z
 v
al
ue
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
 le
ve
ls
 a
re
 in
di
ca
te
d 
by
: *
 p
 <
 0
.1
0,
 *
* 
p 
< 
0.
05
, *
**
 p
 <
 0
.0
1.
 
Va
ria
bl
e
C
SR
 N
et
 <
 0
  
C
SR
 N
et
 =
 0
C
SR
 N
et
 >
 0
  
D
iff
er
en
ce
 C
SR
 
N
et
>0
 - 
C
SR
 
N
et
<0
 fi
rm
s
T-
te
st
W
ilc
ox
on
 ra
nk
 
su
m
 Z
	   29 
 
Predicted CSR 0.185 -0.022 -0.196
(0.118) (0.119) (0.142)
[0.017] [-0.0021] [-0.018]
Residual CSR -0.007 -0.020 -0.012
(0.025) (0.021) (0.032)
[-0.0007] [-0.001] [-0.001]
Interaction Pred. CSR - Neg. Returns 0.367 -0.047 -0.157
(0.376) (0.095) (0.140)
[0.035] [-0.004] [-0.015]
Interaction Res. CSR - Neg. Returns -0.357 *** -0.283 *** 0.006
(0.104) (0.080) (0.157)
[-0.034] [-0.027] [0.000]
Negative Returns -1.290 *** -1.035 *** -0.916 ***
(0.244) (0.330) (0.360)
[-0.123] [-0.099] [-0.087]
Positive Returns -0.006 -0.001 -0.006
(0.200) (0.200) (0.199)
Returns Volatility 0.213 *** 0.201 *** 0.223 ***
(0.054) (0.054) (0.057)
Board Size 0.054 *** 0.059 *** 0.054 ***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Independent Directors (%) 0.533 ** 0.477 * 0.518 **
(0.264) (0.261) (0.263)
CEO Age (log) 5.663 *** 5.653 *** 5.637 ***
(0.418) (0.418) (0.417)
Retirement Age CEO 0.126 0.129 0.122
(0.133) (0.133) (0.133)
Assets (log) 0.025 0.073 0.225
(0.036) (0.156) (0.140)
Book to Market Ratio -0.194 -0.352 -0.337 **
(0.199) (0.227) (0.164)
Intercept -26.168 *** -26.307 *** -27.115 ***
(1.795) (2.047) (2.005)
Number of observations 19,139 19,139 19,139
Year Fixed Yes Yes Yes
Wald Test 318.31 *** 317.31 *** 291.85 ***
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.075 0.073
CSR Net CSR Strengths CSR Concerns
Table 6 - Panel A
Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility (Predicted and Residual) on CEO Turnover Performance Sensitivity
This table analyzes the determinants of CEO Turnover, with respect to the various dimensions of CSR. The 
dependent variable is CEO Turnover; our main variables of interest are the predicted and residuals of CSR Net, CSR 
Strengths, CSR Concerns and their interactions with Negative Returns. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% level. Standard Errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parenthesis. Margins are reported in square 
brackets.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Levels of significance are indicated by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Variable
(1) (2) (3)
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CSR Net -0.028 0.006
(0.021) (0.018)
[-0.002] [0.0007]
Interaction CSR Net - Negative Returns -0.206 *** -0.061
(0.065) (0.086)
[-0.014] [-0.007]
Positive Returns -0.329 0.165
(0.301) (0.261)
Negative Returns -1.439 *** -0.942 ***
(0.334) (0.294)
[-0.104] [-0.108]
Returns Volatility 0.417 *** 0.061
(0.079) (0.071)
Board Size 0.059 0.033
(0.030) (0.021)
Independent Directors (%) -0.290 1.000 ***
(0.395) (0.340)
CEO Age (log) 6.549 *** 4.914 ***
(0.696) (0.559)
Retirement Age CEO 0.324 0.124
(0.266) (0.147)
Assets (log) -0.030 0.100 **
(0.045) (0.040)
Book to Market Ratio -0.513 ** -0.409
(0.252) (0.225)
Intercept -28.567 *** -23.604 ***
(2.926) (2.389)
Number of observations 10,121 10,106
Year and Industry Fixed Yes Yes
Wald Test 224.63 *** 122.46 ***
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.055
High CEO Tenure
Table 6 - Panel B
Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on CEO Turnover Performance Sensitivity by tenure
This table analyzes the determinants of CEO Turnover, which is the dependent variable. Our main 
variable of interest is the interaction between CSR and Negative Returns. All variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% level. Standard Errors are clustered by firm and are reported in parenthesis. 
Margins are reported in square brackets. Model (1)  is run over a subsample of observations in which 
CEO Tenure is below the median; Model (2) is run over the subsample of observation in which CEO 
Tenure is above the median.                                                                                                                                                                                     
Levels of significance are indicated by:  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Variable
(1) (2)
Low CEO Tenure
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-0.127 -0.149 0.022
(0) (0) (0)
0.622 0.637 -0.015
(0) (0) (0)
0.529 0.588 -0.059
(0.5) (0.5) (0)
-0.053 -0.015 0.037
(-0.048) (-0.014) (0.034)
-0.002 -0.009 -0.007
(-0.0001) (-0.003) (-0.002)
**
***-4.95***-5.63
Diff Returns
Diff ROA
1.54 2.45*
Variable CEO Tx = 0 CEO Tx = 1 Difference T-test Wilcoxon rank sum Z
Difference in Changes in CSR between Turnover and Non-Turnover Years
Table 7 - Panel A
This table examines changes in CSR around turnovers and differences in CSR between turnover and non-turnover years. 
The variables represent the difference between (i) the change in CSR two years after the CEO turnover and (ii) the 
change in CSR two years before the CEO turnover. For example: Diff CSR net is the difference between forward CSR 
net two years and lag CSR net two years. Finally, we also examine changes in market returns and return on assests 
around turnovers and differences between turnover and non-turnover years. The significance of the differences are 
analyzed using a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank test.                                                                                                                                                                                          
The level of the test significance is indicated by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
-0.37
0.123
0.13Diff CSR Net
Diff CSR Strengths
Diff CSR Concerns
0.44
-0.24
-1.47
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Negative Returns (ind) 0.144 ** 0.029 -0.218 ***
(0.054) (0.052) (0.054)
CEO Turnover 0.038 0.039 0.050
(0.116) (0.112) (0.114)
Neg. Ret. (ind) - CEO Turnover -0.190 0.092 0.197
(0.161) (0.157) (0.159)
Change in Assets (log) -0.327 0.605 ** 1.14 ***
(0.314) (0.302) (0.322)
Number of observations 9.176 9.176 9.176
Year and Industry Fixed Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 33.45 *** 31.48 *** 122 ***
Pseudo R2 0,012 0.023 0.036
Table 7 - Panel B
Determinants of Change in CSR (Net, Strengths, Concerns)
This table examines the determinants of changes in CSR (Net, Strengths, Concerns) around turnovers. We 
run a logistic regression of positive changes in CSR. Our dependent variable is an indicator variable of 
changes in CSR set to one in cases where the change in CSR is greater than zero and zero otherwise. We 
measure the change in CSR as the difference between the two-year average lead and two-year average lag. 
The dependent variable is the change in CSR Net in Model (1); the change in CSR Strengths in Model (2); 
the change in CSR Concerns in Model (3). Our main variables of interest are: Negative Returns (ind), 
which is and indicator variable set to one if returns are negative and zero otherwise; CEO Turnover and 
Neg. Ret. (ind) - CEO Turnover, which is the interaction between the two. Both models are run with 
change in log assets, industry, and year fixed effects. Standard Errors are clustered by firm and are 
reported in parenthesis.                                                                                                                                               
Levels of significance are indicated by:  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Variable
(1) (2) (3)
CSR Net CSR Strengths CSR Concerns
